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Abstract. Economics uses rational actor models, but what about anthropology? I present an 
interpretation of the influential anthropologist Marilyn Strathern according to which she engages 
in a kind of rational actor modelling, but a kind that is different from economic modelling.
Rational actor modelling is a method that is used for making predictions in economics. 
For example, if demand for houses increases but supply stays the same, an economist would 
probably predict an increase in the prices of houses by using this method. A way of arriving at 
this prediction is as follows. The economist would assume that individuals selling houses pursue 
the goal of getting as much money from house sales as possible and pursue this goal rationally – 
they take the actions which seem most likely to achieve this goal given the information available 
to them. The economist would further assume that both buyers and sellers have full information 
about the market, including that demand for houses has increased but supply has stayed the 
same. Perhaps not everyone selling a house does pursue this goal rationally and perhaps not all 
individuals have full information, but a simple model of behaviour which relies on these 
assumptions seems close enough to reality for its predictions to be reliable. Even if the model is 
very different to reality, if we have some reason to think that its predictions will roughly or 
exactly obtain in some contexts, then it is of use (Freidman and Savage 1948: 298).
Economics is well-known for involving rational actor models. The value of these models 
is a perennial object of debate. What about anthropology? Do anthropologists ever rely on 
rational actor models? I present an interpretation of the influential anthropologist Marilyn 
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Strathern according to which she too engages in a kind of rational actor modelling, albeit a kind 
that is different from economic modelling. But I begin with some guidance from an earlier 
anthropologist, namely Edmund Leach.
If an anthropologist tells us that a certain group believes something, it may seem that they 
are providing information about the psychology of group members, specifically how these 
individuals think. But in his article “Virgin Birth,” Leach tells us that we should not interpret the 
claim in this way. He writes:
When an ethnographer reports that “members of the X tribe believe that…” he is 
giving description of an orthodoxy, a dogma, something which is true of the 
culture as a whole. But Professor Spiro (and all the neo-Tylorians who think like 
him) desperately believe that the evidence can tell us much more than that – that 
dogma and ritual must somehow correspond to the inner psychological attitudes 
of the actors concerned. (1966: 40)
According to Leach’s instructions, if an anthropologist says that the Bororo believe that there are 
ghosts, the anthropologist means that within Bororo culture it is an orthodoxy that there are 
ghosts. What is it for this to be an orthodoxy? Here we need only state one condition that must be 
met: that some members of this culture make statements that assert the existence of ghosts. There 
are, of course, other conditions. Regardless of these, the anthropologist should not be interpreted 
as saying that the Bororo psychologically accept that there are ghosts. Some Bororo may just be 
going along with the orthodoxy to fit in. In fact, all of them may be pretending.
On different occasions, Strathern writes as if she would like to be interpreted in 
accordance which Leach’s instructions (1992: xvii; 1999: xii). I shall focus on her book After 
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Nature: English kinship in the late twentieth century. In the preface, she tells readers not to think 
of her as making psychological claims:
...the apparent ascription of attitudes and beliefs to this or that set of persons 
should not be mistaken for a study of what people think or feel. (1992: xvii)
But there are points within the main body of her book where it is unclear how to apply Leach’s 
instructions to what she says. For example, she says that English culture, from 1860 to 1960, 
accorded the following three propositions the status of facts: there are individuals; there is 
diversity; and individuals reproduce individuals (1992: 53). The rise of cloning in the late 
twentieth century led to doubts about this third proposition. (See appendix 1 for a clarification of 
it.) But was it ever an orthodoxy? Did anyone in England from this period actually assert that 
individuals reproduce individuals?
One way of making sense of Strathern is to interpret her view as follows: although the 
English did not assert this proposition, they did assume its truth. If we examine what they did 
say, this proposition was assumed by some of their assertions. In After Nature, Strathern 
encourages this interpretation. In fact, she goes further and endorses a specific conception of 
assumptions. She describes anthropologists as making explicit what is or was implicit and 
characterizes unstated assumptions as implicit (1992: 7-8). The characterization conveys that 
assumptions are features of the object of study, as much as what is explicitly said is, but they 
have the quality of being implicit. Let us call this the implicit-explicit interpretation.1
However, there is another interpretation of Strathern, which we can call the predictive 
model interpretation. This interpretation may appear to be against the spirit of Strathern’s 
anthropological research, yet it or something close to it strikes me as fitting better with her 
1 On the implicit-explicit interpretation, what Strathern thinks is that these propositions are unstated assumptions and 
that such assumptions are or were implicit. A question I shall not address is whether these commitments can be 
separated from one another, e.g. one can hold that these propositions are unstated assumptions and not implicit.
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commitments. To illustrate this other interpretation, imagine that a baby is born in 1900 and that 
someone who sees the baby says, “His eyes are just like his father’s.” Imagine that someone else 
replies, “I am sure he will have a personality which is absolutely identical to his father’s as 
well.” This claim would be regarded as quite strange.2 It might well be met with the response, 
“Don’t be silly. Of course, he is going to have his own personality.” The propositions which 
Strathern attributes to English kinship from 1860 to 1960, including that individuals reproduce 
individuals, enable us to predict this reaction. On the predictive model interpretation, there is no 
commitment to the proposition’s being somehow there within English culture, but implicit. 
Strathern is neutral on this issue. The set of propositions which Strathern attributes to English 
culture is an anthropologist’s construct3 and its value is to enable prediction of what would be 
said, under certain circumstances.
This is a kind of rational actor modelling, but different from economic modelling. It does 
not specify preferences, such as the preference to maximize profit. The anthropologist models 
members of a given culture as if they accept a coherent set of propositions about what is 
generally the case and as if they react to specific circumstances by consistently applying these 
general propositions to the circumstances. We can call this rational actor modelling because of 
the coherence of the propositions and the consistency of their application. In the example above, 
the respondent is modelled as starting from the general proposition that individuals reproduce 
individuals and a feature of this particular case – that the father is an individual  –  to conclude 
that the child will not have a personality which is identical to the father’s. The anthropologist is 
2 I am not sure that it is a good idea for anthropologists to test their subjects by intentionally making “weird 
remarks.” The example is not inspired by actual anthropological practice; it is a crude but vivid illustration of the 
predictive-model interpretation. See footnote 6 below for evidence of behavioural predictions in Strathern’s writing.
3 If propositions are abstract entities, and cannot stand in causal relations and so cannot be “constructed,” the idea is 
that the anthropologist entertained them and found them to be useful but there is no commitment to their being stated 
by members of the culture or implied or psychologically accepted by them.
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neutral on the question of whether members of the culture actually accept a coherent set of 
general propositions and then consistently apply them. If the model enables prediction, it is a 
good model.
Some people who are accustomed to only seeing mathematical models may say that this 
is not a proper model. It is the beginnings of a model, but it is not a proper model until it has 
been presented in the language of mathematics. A distinguished philosopher encourages this 
response in an article aimed at a wider readership than academics.4 But I do not see why some 
models cannot be presented in words. Anyway, the crucial point here is that there are close 
resemblances between what Strathern is doing, on this interpretation, and uncontroversial cases 
of rational actor modelling. For convenience of expression, I shall continue to speak of what we 
are dealing with as a model.
Should we endorse the predictive model interpretation of Strathern? Strathern does not 
say why she avoids psychological attributions. The reason offered by Leach is that he is a 
positivist (1966: 39). In other words, he thinks that an anthropologist should only make claims 
that can be verified by observation. There is another part to his reason, which combines with this 
positivism: he thinks psychological qualities cannot be observed (1966: 40). At this point, it is 
worth noting how Leach responds to a question within British social anthropology. British 
anthropologists between the 1930s and 1960s focused on describing social structures, such as 
complementary systems of roles within an institution. Leach’s response to the question of 
whether social structures are observable is that they are not. He classes them as models (Leach 
1954: 5; Nutini 1965: 711; Bock 1967). Now if Strathern’s reason for avoiding psychological 
4 Timothy Williamson encourages this response when he writes, “Often, the only feasible approach to understanding 
complex natural and social processes is by building theoretical “models”, sets of highly simplified assumptions in 
the form of mathematical equations, which can then be studied and tested against observed data.” (2019) For other 
attempts to understand what a model is, see Alexandrova and Northcott 2009.
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attributions is the same as Leach’s – positivism and the view that psychological qualities cannot 
be observed – then the question arises as to whether she can observe that the propositions she 
attributes to English culture are part of it. It is not transparent that she can. A natural move for 
someone with Strathern’s intellectual background is to say that the propositions are part of a 
model. The implicit-explicit interpretation fits better with the text of After Nature, but in the 
absence of explanations, there is a “philosophical pressure” towards the predictive model 
interpretation.
It is surprising that Strathern does not offer this interpretation herself, or else some subtly 
different one that appeals to models, given what she says in her 1988 book The Gender of the 
Gift. There she warns against treating the systematic analyses that anthropologists offer as 
revealing something systematic within reality. She writes:
Their danger lies in making the system appear to be the subject under scrutiny 
rather than the method of scrutiny. The phenomena come to appear contained or 
encompassed by the systematics, and thus themselves systematic. So we get 
entangled in world systems and deep structures and worry about the ‘level’ at 
which they exist in the phenomena themselves. (1988: 7)
Here Strathern thinks of systematic analyses of phenomena as constructions by anthropologists 
which are useful for anthropology as a discipline, while remaining neutral on the extent to which 
these analyses capture how things really are.5 So it is surprising that, in After Nature, she does 
not treat the coherent set of propositions that she attributes to English culture in this way – as a 
model that is useful for some end of anthropology – while remaining neutral on whether it is 
5 Elsewhere she accepts Leach’s point about social structures. She writes, “The resultant models were an attempt to 
discover what could be said about organization and regularity in social life, not an attempt to deny that people were 
individuals or events improvised.” (1990b: 311-312)
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somehow there, implicitly, within the culture.6
Appendix 1: a clarification of “individuals reproduce individuals”
I have used the proposition that individuals reproduce individuals as an example, but 
without clarifying it. For the points made within the main body of the paper, it did not seem 
necessary to do so. Strathern herself does not clarify the proposition, but I shall offer a brief 
clarification which I believe captures her thinking. An individual is a person who, although they 
may be part of various things, such as a family or a football team, is also a distinct entity in their 
own right; furthermore, they have a character (or personality) which is unique to them. The claim 
that individuals reproduce individuals is the claim that, if an individual reproduces, their 
offspring is also a person who is a distinct entity in their own right, with a character unique to 
them (or if they are very young and if unique characters are not always present from the 
beginning of life, they will have such a character given a path of development that does not 
involve a very early death).
Appendix 2: the two interpretations and the ontological turn
The two interpretations I have presented both cast Strathern as presenting a worldview, 
either one implicit in the culture or one that is bound up with a model. However, there is a 
movement in anthropology that has been strongly influenced by Strathern but opposes itself to 
presenting worldviews, namely the ontological movement (Henare et al. 2007: 10; see also 
Miller 2006/2007: 85). How can we make sense of this combination? At least part of what has 
6 Perhaps there is some other end, apart from prediction, which she might specify. Nevertheless, the rejection of the 
implicit-explicit interpretation would remain. Strathern may not be comfortable with some preconceptions about 
scientific prediction, but she does attribute behavioural dispositions to people, e.g. “The Melanesian material serves 
as a commentary on the manner in which the English construe relations.” (1992: 72)
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happened is this: members of this movement have taken a point that Strathern makes and drawn 
consequences from it which are very different from the consequences she draws (Henare et al. 
2007: 3). Strathern says that if anthropology is about presenting worldviews, then there is no 
reason to refer to artefacts except as illustrations: examples that can help the reader understand 
propositions that are part of a worldview but are in principle dispensable – if one refers to a 
certain artefact, one does not have to refer to that artefact (1990a: 37-38). Her reaction to this 
point is that it justifies a division of labour between anthropologists and museologists, who do 
not treat artefacts as mere illustrations (1990a: 39-40). Members of the ontological movement 
react by saying that it is a good idea for anthropology to fully incorporate artefacts and a 
revolution is needed to do so, in which it gives up on presenting worldviews (Henare et al. 2007: 
3, 10).
But should we accept Strathern’s point to begin with? In England, Dolly the sheep was a 
well-known example of the use of cloning technology. Is Dolly merely a helpful but dispensable 
illustration when trying to describe or model changing English worldviews in response to 
cloning? It is plausible that one has to model the English, or a proportion of them in the early 
1990s, as thinking as follows: “If a sheep has been cloned, probably a human being can now be 
cloned. A sheep has been cloned. In which case, probably a human being can now be cloned.” Of 
course, it is questionable whether Dolly should be referred to as an artefact, but if Strathern’s 
point is correct, then it applies to any particular being, artefact or not – there is no need to reason 
to refer to that particular being7 except as an example that is helpful for readers (see Edward 
2018).
7 If there is underdeterminism in relation to modelling, it seems to me that one will still have to introduce a much 
more specific proposition than the more general ones Strathern associates with a worldview – a proposition that is 
the nearest counterpart to one which refers to a particular being, given some other system of concepts.
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